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Personal Bankruptcy Law, Wealth and Entrepreneurship: 
Theory and Evidence from the Introduction of a “Fresh Start”
* 
 
A personal bankruptcy law that allows for a “fresh start” after bankruptcy reduces the 
individual risk involved in entrepreneurial activity. On the other hand, as risk shifts to creditors 
who recover less of their credit after a debtor’s bankruptcy, lenders may charge higher 
interest rates or ration credit supply, which can hamper entrepreneurship. Both aspects of a 
more forgiving personal bankruptcy law are less relevant for wealthy potential entrepreneurs 
who still risk losing their wealth, but tend not to face higher interest rates because they 
provide collateral. This paper illustrates these effects in a model and tests the hypotheses 
derived by exploiting the introduction of a “fresh start” policy in Germany in 1999 as a natural 
experiment, based on representative household panel data. The results indicate that the 
insurance effect of a more forgiving personal bankruptcy law exceeds the interest effect and 
on balance encourages less wealthy individuals to enter into entrepreneurship. 
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1  Introduction 
As income from entrepreneurial activity is considerably more uncertain than income from 
wage employment, entrepreneurship implies a greater risk of bankruptcy. For entrepreneurs 
owning unincorporated businesses, business debts are personal liabilities. Personal bankruptcy 
law can, therefore, be expected to play an important role in the decisions to become and to 
remain an entrepreneur. Stimulating entrepreneurship is now a major policy objective in many 
countries with the intent to promote innovation, competitiveness, and job creation. From an 
economic point of view, the main policy leeway in personal bankruptcy law is between more 
creditor friendly procedures and more debtor friendly ones. The former ensures that creditors 
recover as much of their credit as possible in case of a debtor’s bankruptcy (“absolute priority 
rule” of creditors over equity holders); while the later provides a discharge from debt when 
certain conditions are met, thus giving the bankrupt person the chance to start anew. Such 
“fresh  start”  policies  are  widely  considered  to  promote  small  business  entrepreneurship, 
because relief from debt burden allows entrepreneurs to start a new business after a failure. 
This is the main argument put forward by Germany’s Merkel led government, which intends 
to cut the time to discharge from debt after personal bankruptcy from six down to three years. 
A  simple  model  developed  in  this  paper  illustrates,  however,  that  a  more  forgiving 
bankruptcy law has two opposing effects on entrepreneurial activity. On the one hand, it may 
make entrepreneurship more attractive, as entrepreneurs do not risk losing as much wealth 
and  future  income  in  case  of  bankruptcy.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  risk  is  shifted  to 
lenders, who recover less in case of debtor bankruptcy, and they may react by charging higher 
interest rates or rationing credit supply. This may hamper entrepreneurship, which depends on 
capital.  The  model  further  shows  that  both  aspects  of  personal  bankruptcy  law  are  less 
relevant  for  wealthy  potential  entrepreneurs.  A  debtor-friendly  bankruptcy  law  does  not   2
decrease their risk as much, because they still risk losing their wealth; and it does not increase 
the interest rate they face as much either, because they provide collateral. 
The hypothesized difference in the effect of personal bankruptcy law depending upon 
wealth  level  is  tested  in  an  empirical  investigation.  In  1999,  Germany  introduced  its 
Insolvency Code, which provided a “fresh start” policy for the first time in Germany. Using 
representative household panel data, I exploit this policy reform as a natural experiment and 
estimate its effects on entry into and exit out of self-employment and on the probability of 
being self-employed by wealth level. The results indicate that the introduction of a “fresh 
start”  on  balance  made  entrepreneurship  more  attractive,  especially  for  less  wealthy 
entrepreneurs. The explanation offered by the model is that the insurance effect of the more 
forgiving personal bankruptcy law outweighs the effect of an increasing interest rate. 
The small empirical literature on personal bankruptcy law and entrepreneurial activity 
focuses on differences in bankruptcy procedures across different countries or states in the 
USA. Fan and White (2003) exploit variation in the homestead exemption across US states,
2 
finding that the probability of owning a business is 35% higher in states with unlimited rather 
than low exemptions. Armour and Cumming (2008) use aggregated data from 15 countries 
and report that entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy laws increase self-employment rates. Both 
results  are  qualitatively  consistent  with  this  paper’s  findings,  which  are  derived  using  a 
completely different empirical strategy and data. Using the same source of variation as Fan 
and White (2003), Agarwal et al. (2005) further find that the likelihood of small business 
owners filing for bankruptcy increases with higher exemption levels. 
There is also evidence of the reaction by banks to more forgiving personal bankruptcy 
laws. Berkowitz and White (2004), again using homestead exemption variation across US 
states, report that small firms in states with more generous exemptions face higher interest 
                                                 
2 A homestead exemption makes personal bankruptcy law more forgiving, as homeowners may keep their home 
up to a certain threshold after personal bankruptcy (Chapter 7 of US personal bankruptcy law).   3
rates  or  do  not  obtain  the  desired  amount  of  credit.  Similarly,  but  not  focusing  on 
entrepreneurship,  Gropp  et  al.  (1997)  find  that  more  generous  exemptions  reduce  the 
availability and amount of credit to low-asset households and, at the same time, increase the 
amount of credit held by high-asset borrowers. Davydenko and Franks (2008) compare the 
effects  of  bankruptcy  law  in  France,  Germany,  and  the  UK,  using  firm  data.  The  results 
indicate that banks respond to creditor-unfriendly codes, with, for example, stricter collateral 
requirements. 
The theoretical literature highlights that greater creditor protection preserves incentives 
for entrepreneurs to succeed before bankruptcy, whereas a more forgiving code maintains 
incentives to exert effort after bankruptcy. Ayotte (2006) analyses this trade-off in a principal-
agent  model  and  argues  that  “fresh  start”  policies  generate  social  gains  by  preserving  an 
entrepreneur’s  post-bankruptcy  incentives.  Two  working  papers  come  to  opposing 
conclusions. Mankart and Rodano (2010) develop a quantitative general equilibrium model 
and conclude that higher wealth exemptions would increase entrepreneurship in the US. A 
key feature is that they distinguish between unsecured and secured credit. In contrast, Meh 
and Terajima (2008), who do not make this distinction, develop and calibrate a quantitative 
overlapping-generations model and conclude that eliminating bankruptcy exemptions would 
lead to a modest increase in the fraction of entrepreneurs. 
This paper highlights the role played by personal wealth in the link between personal 
bankruptcy  law  and  entrepreneurial  activity.  A  sizable  literature  shows  that  wealth  has  a 
positive  effect  on  the  probabilities  of  entry  into  entrepreneurship  and  on  being  an 
entrepreneur. Most studies explain this by the presence of credit constraints, which are less 
binding  for  more  wealthy  potential  entrepreneurs  (e.g.  Evans  and  Jovanovic,  1989; 
Blanchflower,  1998;  Holtz-Eakin  et  al.,  1994;  Nykvist,  2008).
3  Similarly,  the  model 
                                                 
3 Hurst and Lusardi (2004) express doubt, however, because they find a positive relationship between wealth and 
the probability of entry into self-employment only for the top 5% of the wealthiest households.   4
developed in this paper illustrates that because less wealthy people provide less collateral, 
lenders  demand  higher  interest  rates  from  them  as  a  risk  premium,  and  this  makes 
entrepreneurship more costly and therefore less attractive for the less wealthy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional 
background by detailing the introduction of a “fresh start” policy in Germany in 1999. Section 
3 develops the theoretical model of personal bankruptcy law, wealth, and entrepreneurship, 
and derives hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 outlays the empirical strategy to analyze the 
1999 policy reform as a natural experiment. The empirical results appear in section 5, and 
section 6 concludes the analysis. 
2  Introduction  of  a  “fresh  start”  in  the  German  personal 
bankruptcy law 
In Germany, a new insolvency law, the Insolvency Code (Insolvenzordnung), came into effect 
January 1, 1999.
4 The new law allows private persons to open insolvency proceedings.
5 In 
particular, for the first time in Germany, the reform provides the possibility of a “fresh start” 
after  insolvency.  Specifically,  after  seven  years  of  “good  behavior”,  remaining  debt  is 
discharged (the time to discharge was reduced to six years in December 2001). During these 
seven (six) years, the person who filed for insolvency must pay any income exceeding an 
exemption threshold of net income to the creditors. This threshold is considered the minimal 
cost of living and is about 990 euro per month for a person without dependents. Before the 
reform, according to the former bankruptcy law which dated back to 1877,
6 there was almost 
no chance for a discharge from debt for personal debtors, so after bankruptcy they had the 
                                                 
4 For an English translation of the German Insolvency Code and a commentary, see Braun (2006). 
5 With the reform, German bankruptcy law became more similar to US law, where Chapters 7 and 13 regulate 
personal bankruptcy (cf. White, 2007). 
6 The relevant laws before 1999 were the Bankruptcy Code (Konkursordnung) from 1877, which describes a 
compulsory  liquidation  procedure,  and  the  Forced  Settlement  Act  (Vergleichsordnung)  from  1935,  which 
describes court composition as a restructuring procedure for corporations (cf. Davydenko and Franks, 2008).   5
prospect of ceding all income exceeding the threshold to the creditors until all debt was paid 
back, sometimes for the rest of their life. The new personal bankruptcy law is of special 
relevance for entrepreneurs owning unincorporated firms (proprietorships and partnerships), 
because all business debts, which are typically large in comparison to consumer credits, are 
personal  liabilities  of  the  business  owner,  so  these  entrepreneurs  may  file  for  personal 
bankruptcy and enjoy the possibility of the “fresh start”. 
In many countries the financial and economic crisis, which culminated in 2008 and 2009, 
triggered a new policy debate around the economic consequences of bankruptcy law. As the 
number of bankruptcies has risen, policymakers have suggested changes in bankruptcy laws 
with the intention of facilitating the restructuring and recovery of insolvent firms to limit the 
consequences of the crisis, including the loss of jobs. This discussion has not been limited to, 
but has included, personal bankruptcy law because of its relevance for small businesses. 
In Germany the policy debate about bankruptcy law also has taken center stage, even 
though the increase in personal bankruptcies during the crisis has not been dramatic.
7 The 
coalition government, led by Angela Merkel, agreed to work out a reform of bankruptcy law 
(coalition agreement between CDU, CSU, and FDP, 2009). The minister of justice, Sabine 
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (2010), said in a speech that “the reform of insolvency law is 
the most important project in business law”. Specifically, concerning personal bankruptcy 
law, she intends to cut the time to discharge from six years down to three. She argues that this 
would allow “business founders, but also over indebted consumers to bounce back after a 
false  start”.  As  the  supposed  link  between  personal  bankruptcy  law  and  entrepreneurial 
activity  is  so  central  to  policy  debate  in  Germany  and  elsewhere,  this  paper  intends  to 
contribute to clarifying thought and gathering evidence on potential effects. 
                                                 
7 Germany counted 32,687 insolvencies by enterprises in 2009, this was 11.6% more than in 2008. 18,045 of 
these were for unincorporated firms (whose owners are subject to personal bankruptcy law), 5.2% more than the 
year before. In addition, 127,412 private persons filed for insolvency, up 3.0% from 2008. 26,310 of these were 
previously self-employed, which represents an increase of 3.1% over 2008 (Federal Statistical Office, 2010).   6
3  Theory  of  personal  bankruptcy  law,  wealth,  and 
entrepreneurship 
In this section I develop a simple model of bankruptcy law and entrepreneurial activity that is 
similar  to  Fan  and  White  (2003),  but  further  elaborates  on  the  role  of  personal  wealth, 
deriving differences in effects by wealth level, and adapts the model to the German situation. 
Wealth  is  crucial  as  personal  bankruptcy  law  is  expected  to  be  more  relevant  for 
entrepreneurial decisions by less wealthy households, as mentioned in the introduction. 
The model describes an agent’s decision to work as a wage worker or as an entrepreneur. 
She will make her choice between these two alternatives in period t depending on which 
activity yields the higher expected wealth in period t+1. In period t, the potential entrepreneur 
disposes of wealth w, which is the sum of current assets and the net present value of expected 
future income from regular employment after period t+1.
8 Starting a business requires taking 
out  a  fixed  amount  of  debt  b>0,  which  is  due  with  interest  in  period  t+1.  If  a  potential 
entrepreneur decides to  start a  firm, she will receive  an uncertain return z in period t+1; 
suppose that the density of z is f(z). 
In period t+1, entrepreneurs owe b r, where r is the interest factor (one plus the interest 
rate). Entrepreneurs may file for personal bankruptcy in t+1. Suppose x is the net present 
value of future income that cannot be seized by creditors.
9 Before 1999, this was the net 
present value of the legally guaranteed minimum cost of living until all debt was repaid, and 
of full income only thereafter (if complete repayment was reached before death). Since the 
introduction of the “fresh start”, x has increased to the net present value of the minimum cost 
                                                 
8 Returning to wage work is assumed to be a safe fallback option that yields a safe income, so it makes sense that 
both potential entrepreneurs and lenders take the associated value into account. 
9  Bankruptcy  costs  potentially  reduce  x,  as  they  may  decrease  future  disposable  income  after  filing  for 
insolvency. For an explicit consideration of bankruptcy costs see Fan and White (2003).   7
of living in the initial six years after filing for insolvency
10 and of all future income after this 
period,  as  all  remaining  debt  is  discharged  after  six  years.
11  The  interest  factor  r(w,x)  is 
assumed to be set by the lenders as a function of wealth w, which may serve as security, and 
x, because with larger x, lenders risk losing more of the amount lent in case of insolvency. 
If an entrepreneur does not file for bankruptcy, her wealth in period t+1 will be Ws,nb = w 
+  z  –  b r(x,w).  If  she  files  for  bankruptcy,  her  wealth  will  be  Ws,b  =  x.  She  will  file  for 
bankruptcy if and only if Ws,b > Ws,nb ￿ z < x - w + b r(x,w). Thus an entrepreneur’s expected 
wealth in period t+1 is 
( ) ( )
( )
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If instead the agent chooses to be a wage worker in period t, in period t+1 she will have 
wealth Ww = w + v, where v is the salary in period t. 
Lenders are willing to lend the amount b if their expected returns are at least as high as 
the opportunity costs, which are given by b R. The zero-profit condition is written as 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
,
, ,
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- - + + - + + = ∫ ∫ , 
where the first term on the left-hand side represents partial repayment by debtors who file for 
bankruptcy and the second term full repayment by debtors who avoid bankruptcy. Partially 
differentiating both sides of the equation with respect to x and w and solving for the first 
derivatives of r(x,w) yields 
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10 As mentioned, between January 1999 and December 2001 the time to discharge was seven years, but this 
rather small change is not considered in the following. 
11 Of course, if debt is repaid completely before the six years have passed, the debtor can keep the full income 
after repayment. In these cases, the reform did not change x.   8








w x br x w
x w
w x br x w
f z dz r x w











Thus, lenders charge higher interest rates when x increases and lower interest rates when w 
increases.  This  reflects  that  banks  risk  losing  a  larger  share  of  repayments  in  case  of 
bankruptcy when x becomes larger, and that w can be used as collateral.
12 
Turning back to the decision problem of potential entrepreneurs, the partial derivative of 
E(Ws) w.r.t. w is 





w x br x w
E r x w




¶ W ¶  
= -   ¶ ¶  ∫ . 
which is greater than ¶E(Ww)/¶w=1 at least for large w, because the integral approaches 1 
when  w  becomes  large,  and  the  term  in  brackets  is  larger  than  1  since  ¶r/¶w<0.  Thus, 
entrepreneurship becomes more attractive relative to wage employment when more wealth is 
available, which is explained by the cheaper credit. 
The partial derivative of E(Ws) w.r.t. x is 
( ) ( )




, w x br x w s
w x br x w
E r x w
f z dz b f z dz
x x
- + + ¥
-¥ - + +
¶ W ¶
= -
¶ ¶ ∫ ∫ . 
For the moment suppose ¶r/¶x = 0. Then ¶E(Ws)/¶x ≥ ¶E(Ww)/¶x = 0, as the first integral is 
positive,  and  the  inequality  is  strict  as  long  as  there  is  at  least  a  small  probability  of 
bankruptcy. Hence, with fixed interest rates, higher x (i.e a more forgiving insolvency law) 
makes entrepreneurship unambiguously more attractive relative to wage work. If ¶r/¶x > 0 as 
derived above, it is ambiguous whether higher x makes entrepreneurship relatively more or 
less attractive; this depends on whether the insurance effect or the interest effect dominates. 
The cross-derivative of entrepreneurs’ expected wealth is derived as 
                                                 
12 Instead of raising interest rates when x increases, lenders could also ration credit supply (cf. Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981).   9
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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If ¶r/¶x¶w > 0 it follows unambiguously that ¶E(Ws)/¶x¶w < 0, given the signs of the first 
derivatives of r derived above. The positive change in E(Ws) when w increases (see above) 
thus reduces when x increases. Accordingly, the positive effect of w on the attractiveness of 
entrepreneurship  relative  to  wage  work  also  decreases  when  x  increases,  since 
¶E(Ww)/¶x¶w = 0. The intuition is that the more wealth w an entrepreneur disposes of, the less 
she benefits from the insurance effect implied by an increase in x. If ¶r/¶x¶w < 0, the sign of 
¶E(Ws)/¶w¶x is ambiguous, however. In this case, it is possible that the interest effect exceeds 
the  insurance  effect.  Poorer  entrepreneurs  suffer  more  from  the  increased  credit  costs 
triggered by larger x than wealthier entrepreneurs. It remains an empirical question which 
effect dominates, as the sign of 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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depends on whether the first or the second summand in the nominator is larger, which cannot 
be determined without further assumptions. Note that while ¶r(x,w)/¶x¶w > 0 is sufficient to 
conclude that the insurance effect dominates, ¶r(x,w)/¶x¶w < 0 is necessary, but not sufficient 
to conclude that the interest effects dominates. 
This leads to two alternative hypotheses for the empirical work:
13 
H1: The positive effect of wealth on the probability of  entry into and of being self-
employment  decreased  after  the  introduction  of  the  insolvency  code  on  January  1,  1999 
                                                 
13 For both hypotheses, the null hypothesis is that the introduction of the “fresh start” policy did not change the 
effect of wealth on self-employment at all.   10
(which increased x). The insurance effect dominates and the introduction of the “fresh start” 
made self-employment more attractive especially for less wealthy potential entrepreneurs. 
H2: The positive effect of wealth on the probability of  entry into and of being self-
employment increases further after the introduction of the insolvency code. The interest effect 
dominates and the “fresh start” legislation made self-employment less attractive especially for 
less wealthy potential entrepreneurs. 
4  Empirical analysis of the natural experiment 
4.1  Identification strategy 
To test the hypotheses derived above, I exploit the introduction of the Insolvency Code in 
Germany on January 1, 1999, as a natural experiment. Specifically, the model predicts that the 
policy reform, which made a “fresh start” available, changed the effects of wealth on the 
probabilities of entry into self-employment and on being self-employed. Therefore I estimate 
models of the probabilities of entry and of self-employment state, where the effect of wealth 
is allowed to change with the policy shift, controlling for other relevant factors. Then I test if 
the change in the effect of wealth is significantly negative, which would support hypothesis 
H1, or positive, which would support H2. 
This  estimation  strategy  adapts  the  difference-in-difference  (DID)  estimator  (e.g. 
Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008). The DID estimator contrasts a  group identified as being 
affected  by  the  policy  change  with  an  unaffected  comparison  group.  One  calculates  the 
change  in  the  outcome  before  and  after  the  policy  reform  both  for  the  treatment  and 
comparison groups. The difference in these changes is interpreted as the average treatment 
effect  of  the  policy  reform  on  the  treated.  Identification  requires  the  common  trend 
assumption, which states that in the absence of the policy reform, the change in the outcome 
would  have  been  the  same  in  the  two  groups.  In  this  application,  less  wealthy  potential   11
entrepreneurs are the treatment and more wealthy the comparison group, because, as argued 
above, bankruptcy law is more relevant for less wealthy people. As it would be arbitrary to set 
a threshold of wealth that sharply separates the treatment from the comparison group, I test if 
the  effect  of  the  continuous  wealth  variable  on  entrepreneurial  activity  changes  with  the 
reform. The common trend assumption in this application states that in the absence of the 
reform, the effect of wealth on entrepreneurship would not have changed at the time of the 
reform. Several empirical tests in section 5 assess the plausibility of this assumption. 
4.2  Discrete time hazard rate model 
The probability of entry into self-employment is specified as a discrete time hazard rate model 
and estimated conditional on the tenure in dependent employment or the duration of non-
employment, based on the sample of those in dependent employment and those not in paid 
work. For additional information, I analogously estimate a hazard rate model of exit from 
self-employment conditional on the duration of the current spell in self-employment, based on 
the sample of the self-employed. I use yearly data because the interviews occur once a year, 
and the covariates are not available for higher frequencies. Applying discrete time hazard rate 
models allows consistently taking into account state dependence and avoids survivorship bias. 
Another advantage of the hazard rate model is that all the explanatory variables, especially 
wealth,  are  measured  before  potential  entries  into  (or  exits  from)  self-employment  occur. 
Starting from a  general notation of  a survivor  model, Appendix B derives the  estimation 
equation  as  a  logit  model  of  the  transition  probability  conditional  on  the  duration  of  the 
current state, estimated on the data in person-year format (cf. Caliendo et al., 2010). 
The baseline hazard, which captures duration dependence, is specified flexibly as a third 
degree polynomial of the duration in the current state. For example, in the model of exit from 
self-employment, we expect the probability of exit to be high during the initial years of self-
employment and to decline over time, once the initial hurdles are passed (Caliendo et al.,   12
2010). The model of entry into self-employment allows the baseline hazards to differ between 
those in dependent employment and those not working. This is achieved by an interaction of 
the variables capturing the spell duration with a dummy variable indicating the current state. 
For  those  in  dependent  employment,  for  instance,  the  probability  of  switching  to  self-
employment may decrease with tenure, e.g. because of habituation, whereas for unemployed 
people the probability may increase, as self-employment may appear as a means to escape 
unemployment when no other job is found.  
In the long run, entry and exit rates together determine the equilibrium self-employment 
rate.  Instead  of  relying  exclusively  on  the  estimation  of  the  flows,  in  addition  I  directly 
estimate the probability of being self-employed. Specifically, I estimate a logit model of self-
employment  state,  based  on  the  full  sample  of  the  self-employed,  those  in  dependent 
employment, and those not in paid work. 
In the models of entry, exit and self-employment state,  I include as key  explanatory 
variables a measure of individual wealth; a “post reform” dummy variable which is coded as 1 
if the interview occurred after January 1, 1999, when the Insolvency Code came into effect, 
and zero otherwise; and an interaction term between wealth and the post reform dummy. The 
interaction term allows the effect of wealth to change with the reform, which allows testing 
the hypotheses. 
Furthermore, I include as control variables determinants of entrepreneurship known from 
the literature: age, prior working experience and prior unemployment experience, the number 
of children, and dummy variables indicating gender, educational degrees, disability, German 
nationality,  marital  status,  geographical  region,  and  whether  the  father  was  self-employed 
when the respondent was 15 years old. I also include year dummies to control for the business   13
cycle.  Weighted  means  of  the  variables  by  employment  type  appear  in  Table  A  1,
14  and 
variable descriptions in Table A 2, both in Appendix A. 
4.3  Representative household panel data 
The analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a representative yearly 
panel survey containing detailed information about the socio-economic situation of private 
households in Germany.
15 The main analysis draws on the waves between 1993 and 2004; 6 
years before and after the reform on January 1, 1999. During this time, the SOEP covered 
about  12 000  persons  in  6 000  households.
16  Additional  robustness  checks  assess  the 
sensitivity of the results with respect to alternative time windows. 
The concept of entrepreneurship may differ from self-employment, as the former usually 
implies risk bearing and innovation, whereas the latter goes along with income risk but not 
necessarily with innovation. This study focuses on self-employment, which can be identified 
in  the  data  used.  The  classification  of  individuals  as  self-employed  is  based  on  a  survey 
question  about  the  respondents’  occupational  status.  If  respondents  are  employed  or  self-
employed in more than one position, they are asked to report their status in their primary 
activity. The sample is restricted to individuals between 18 and 59 years of age and excludes 
farmers, civil servants, pensioners, and those currently in education, vocational training, or 
military service. I also exclude family members working for a self-employed relative from the 
                                                 
14 The self-employed enjoy considerably more wealth, a higher home ownership rate, and higher gross labor 
income than both employees and those not working. Note that the self-employed on average also work more 
hours  than  employees,  and  average  hourly  income  from  self-employment  is  similar  to  average  wages  in 
Germany (Fossen, 2009). The table further shows that the mean wealth and home ownership rates are somewhat 
higher in the sub-sample of those not in paid work than in the sub-sample of employees. This may be explained 
by the relatively low female work participation rate in Germany; many families with mothers not in the work 
force live in their own houses. 
15 The central aim of the SOEP is to collect representative micro-data about individuals and households. It is 
similar  to  the  BHPS  (British  Household  Panel  Survey)  in  the  UK  and  the  PSID  (Panel  Study  of  Income 
Dynamics) in the USA. A stable set of core questions appears every year, covering the most essential areas, such 
as population and demography; education, training, and qualification; labor market and occupational dynamics; 
earnings, income, and social security; housing; health; household production; and basic orientation. For a more 
detailed data description, see Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007). 
16  The  SOEP  sample  was  enlarged  several  times  during  the  period  of  this  analysis,  most  notably  in  2000 
(“Innovation  Random  Sample”),  but  I  only  use  the  original  sub-samples  started  in  1984  in  West  Germany 
(including immigrants) and 1990 in former East Germany to avoid a strongly unbalanced sample.   14
data set because these individuals are not entrepreneurs in the sense of running their own 
business. I identify year-to-year transitions into and out of self-employment in the data when a 
person is observed in different employment states in two consecutive years, t and t+1. 
4.4  Construction of the wealth measure 
A key variable in this analysis is the individual wealth stock. Questions about individual 
wealth stocks and asset portfolios are available in 2002 (as well in 1988 and 2007, but these 
waves are not used due to the time away from the period of interest). Questions about capital 
income flows (in the year before the interview) and dwelling characteristics are included in 
every survey wave. I use the information available to estimate a proxy of individual wealth as 
the  sum  of  the  three  most  important  wealth  components  of  private  persons,  i.e.  financial 
assets, owner-occupied housing, and other property. I calculate real wealth in prices of 1998, 
using the Consumer Price Index. 
To estimate the stock of financial assets,  I  use household income from interests and 
dividends, which is reported yearly, and a time series of yields on Federal securities provided 
by the German Bundesbank (2010).
17 Some SOEP respondents report the exact amount of 
their financial income, while others just indicate a range. For the latter respondents, I impute 
the mean income of those who actually give the exact amount within this range, following 
Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005). 
To infer the value of property rented out, I draw on household income from renting out, 
which again is provided yearly. I estimate a yearly rate of return to renting out by dividing the 
income from renting out reported in 2002 by the market value of not user-occupied property, 
which is elicited in the 2002 wealth questionnaire. Using plausible rates of return greater than 
                                                 
17  Specifically,  I  use  yields  on  listed  Federal  securities  with  annual  coupon  payments  and  with  a  residual 
maturity of one year, which are derived from the term structure of interest rates. The time series provides yields 
at the end of each month, of which I calculate the yearly averages.   15
0 and smaller than 0.25 only, I calculate a weighted average (using population weights) of 
.0366848, which I then use as the rate of return. 
Finally,  to  estimate  the  value  of  user-occupied  housing,  I  use  yearly  information  on 
housing characteristics. I calculate the net value in 2002 using information from the 2002 
wealth  questionnaire  about  the  market  value  of  user-occupied  property  and  remaining 
mortgage debt. Then I run a regression of this net value on the housing characteristics in the 
cross-section  of  2002.  The  estimated  coefficients  allow  predicting  the  net  value  of  user-
occupied  housing  in  other  years,  using  current  characteristics.  The  characteristics  used  to 
explain  the  value  of  user-occupied  housing  include  its  size  in  square  meters  (and  square 
meters squared) and dummy variables indicating the type of the dwelling, the  age of the 
building, features like balcony/terrace and garden, need for renovation, the town size, and 
region. Furthermore, the SOEP provides a variable indicating the sum of yearly interest and 
mortgage  amortization  payments  for  user-occupied  housing,  and  the  number  of  years  the 
owners have been living in their dwelling. I include both variables and an interaction term 
between them. This allows that for newly bought property, high interest payments indicate 
that the net value is low, because little of the mortgage has been paid off yet, whereas for 
property owned for a long time, high mortgage payments indicate that the net value is high, 
because yearly mortgage amortization payments are usually constant over a fixed period of 
time. Table A 3 in Appendix A presents the regression results. As expected, the coefficient of 
the interaction term is positive and significant, and the estimated coefficients of the other 
variables  are  also  consistent  with  expectations.  The  wealth  measure  will  be  subject  to 
sensitivity analysis in section 5.2.   16
5  Empirical results 
5.1  Estimation results support hypothesis H1 
The upper panel of Table 1 presents the logit coefficients from the baseline estimations of the 
yearly probabilities of entry into and exit from self-employment and of being self-employed 
with  their  cluster  and  heteroscedasticity  robust  standard  errors.  Results  for  all  control 
variables appear in Table A 4 in Appendix A. The coefficients of the polynomial terms of the 
duration in the current employment spell are jointly significant both in the entry and exit 
models, indicating that duration dependence matters for the dynamics of self-employment. In 
the entry model, the three interaction terms of the dummy variable indicating that somebody 
is not in paid work (notempl) with the duration terms are individually insignificant, but jointly 
significant at the 5% level, which shows that employees have a different hazard rate of entry 
into  self-employment  than  people  not  in  paid  work.  The  effects  of  the  control  variables 
confirm results from the literature. Women have lower yearly entry and higher yearly exit 
probabilities and are therefore less likely to be self-employed. Having had a self-employed 
father at the age of 15 increases the probability of entry, decreases the probability of exit, and 
consistently increases the likelihood of being self-employed. A university degree increases the 
probability of entry.   17
Table 1: Probability of self-employment transitions and state 
  A: Entry  A: Exit  A: Self-em. state 
postref  -0.0948  0.1909  0.0965 
  (0.2197)  (0.2364)  (0.0665) 
wealth  0.0483***  -0.0141  0.0682*** 
  (0.0094)  (0.0178)  (0.0124) 
postref * wealth  -0.0450***  -0.1057  -0.0339*** 
  (0.0146)  (0.0699)  (0.0123) 
duration  -0.4500***  -0.4144***   
  (0.0578)  (0.0641)   
dur_sq  0.0241***  0.0261***   
  (0.0055)  (0.0060)   
dur_cu  -0.0004***  -0.0005***   
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)   
notempl  0.3134     
  (0.2418)     
duration_ne  0.1484     
  (0.1630)     
dur_sq_ne  0.0009     
  (0.0240)     
dur_cu_ne  -0.0005     
  (0.0010)     
control variables  yes  yes  yes 
Wald c
2  482.491  222.605  507.860 
Log likelihood  -2860.929  -1159.590  -13459.909 
Person years  55793  4049  59842 
Mean outcome  0.009983  0.098049  0.067662 
Effect pre reform  0.000499***  -0.001118  0.003931*** 
  (0.000174)  (0.001444)  (0.000917) 
Effect post reform  0.000030  -0.009818*  0.002071*** 
  (0.000103)  (0.005907)  (0.000700) 
DiD Ai/Norton  -0.000469**  -0.008700  -0.001860** 
  (0.000199)  (0.005934)  (0.000795) 
DiD Puhani  -0.000403**  -0.008663  -0.002050*** 
  (0.000175)  (0.005928)  (0.000793) 
Notes:  The  table  shows  estimation  results  for  logit  models  of  the  yearly 
probabilities of entry into and exit out of self-employment and of being self-
employed.  The  upper  panel  displays  logit  coefficients  with  cluster  and 
heteroscedasticity  robust  standard  errors  in  parenthesis  and  additional 
statistics. The lower panel shows the average marginal effects of wealth before 
and after the reform of the insolvency code, and the difference following Ai 
and Norton (2003) and Puhani (2008), with standard errors calculated based on 
the Delta method. The logit coefficients of all variables included in the models 
and their marginal effects appear in Table A 4 in Appendix A. Stars (***/**/*) 
indicate significance of logit coefficients at the 1%/5%/10% levels. 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP (1993-2004). 
 
To test the hypotheses, special interest is given to the effect of wealth and how it changes with 
the introduction of the Insolvency Code in 1999. The logit coefficients indicate that before the 
reform, wealth had a positive and significant effect on the probability of entry, no significant 
effect on exit, and, consistently, a positive effect on being self-employed. The positive effect 
of  wealth  on  entry  and  self-employment  state  is  consistent  with  the  prediction  of  the   18
theoretical  model  introduced  in  section  3,  which  suggests  that  entrepreneurship  is  more 
attractive to more wealthy people because their collateral provides them access to cheaper 
credit, and with the literature on liquidity constraints and entrepreneurship summarized in the 
introduction. The coefficient of the interaction term with the “post reform” dummy variable is 
negative and significant in the entry model and the model of self-employment state, which 
shows  that  the  positive effect  of  wealth  declined  after  the  reform.  In  the  exit  model,  the 
interaction term does not indicate a significant change. 
In the lower panel of Table 1, I use the estimated coefficients to calculate the average 
marginal effects of wealth in the three models both before and after the 1999 policy change. 
The cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are obtained using the Delta method. 
The  positive  wealth  effects  in  the  models  of  entry  and  self-employment  state  before  the 
reform are small, but significant. In the entry model, an increase of wealth by 100,000 euro 
(you may think of comparing a house-owner to a tenant) raises the yearly entry probability by 
0.05 percentage points. Given the yearly entry rate in the sample of 1% (see the line “mean 
outcome” in the table), this corresponds to a relative effect of 5%. Similarly, an increase of 
wealth  by  100,000  euro  raises  the  probability  of  being  self-employed  by  0.39  percentage 
points, which is a relative effect of 5.8%, given the self-employment rate of 6.7%. 
Importantly, after the reform, the point estimate of the effect of wealth on entry declines 
to almost zero, and it is no longer significantly different from zero. The effect on being self-
employed  is  still  positive  and  significant,  but  also  considerably  smaller:  0.21  percentage 
points  or  3.1%  in  relative  terms.  The  results  for  entry  and  self-employment  state  are 
consistent, because while the effect of wealth on entry may drop to zero instantaneously after 
the introduction of the Insolvency Code, the stock of the self-employed needs time to adjust. 
There  is  controversy  in  the  literature  how  to  compute  a  difference-in-difference  in 
nonlinear models, such as the binary logit model used here. While Ai and Norton (2003) 
argue that the DID should be calculated as the double difference of the predicted probabilities,   19
Puhani (2008) advocates reporting the marginal effect of the interaction term. The difference 
arises because in contrast to a linear model, in a nonlinear model the double difference in 
general is different from zero even when the coefficient of the interaction term is zero, and the 
discrepancy becomes larger when the probabilities approach 0 or 1. In this application the 
results are not very different, which increases confidence in the suitability of the model in this 
context. 
The before-after difference in the effect of wealth on entry is -0.047 percentage points 
following Ai and Norton, and -0.04 percentage points following Punahi. Thus, the policy 
reform  attenuated  the  positive  pre-reform  effect  of  wealth  on  entry  by  94%  or  81%, 
respectively. The change in the effect of wealth on the probability of being self-employed is 
-0.19 or -0.21 percentage points, respectively, i.e. 47% or 52% of the pre-reform effect (again, 
consider that the stock of the self-employed needs time to adjust). The effects are significant. 
In contrast, the  Insolvency  Code did not significantly  change the effect of wealth on the 
probability of exit from self-employment. 
The results clearly support hypothesis H1, which states that the introduction of the more 
forgiving personal bankruptcy law decreased the positive effect of wealth on entry and on 
self-employment. Having in mind the theoretical model introduced above, this indicates that 
the  insurance  effect  of  the  more  generous  bankruptcy  proceedings  outweigh  the  effect  of 
higher  interest  rates.  As  the  less  wealthy  benefit  more  from  this  than  the  wealthy,  this 
counteracts the positive effect wealth had on self-employment before. 
5.2  Sensitivity analysis indicates robust results 
As  discussed  in  section  4.1,  identification  of  the  effect  of  the  policy  reform  requires  the 
assumption that in the absence of the reform, the effect of wealth would not have changed at 
the time of the reform. While this assumption cannot be tested directly, it is informative to see 
if this assumption holds before and after the reform. I conduct placebo tests, where I pretend   20
that the reform had taken place in 1996, and implement the same adjusted DID estimators as 
before using data before the implementation of the actual reform in 1999, i.e. the period 1993-
1998. Analogously, in another placebo test, I act as if the reform had taken place in 2002 and 
estimate the models on the data after the actual reform, i.e. on the waves 1999-2004. 
The results appear in Table 2. In the placebo reform 1996, none of the interaction terms 
between  the  “post  1996”  dummy  and  wealth  are  significantly  different  from  zero  in  the 
models of entry, exit, and self-employment state, which confirms that the effect of wealth did 
not change in this period.
18 Correspondingly, the DID, reported below, are very small and 
insignificant. As expected, the effects of wealth on entry and on self-employment status, both 
before and after 1996, are positive and significant and of similar magnitude as estimated in 
Table 1 for the period before the reform, and the effect on exit is insignificant again. In the 
2002 placebo reform, the interaction terms are insignificant in the entry and exit models, 
indicating that there were no differential time trends for people with different wealth levels 
after  the  reform.  The  model  of  self-employment  state  indicates  a  positive  and  significant 
change in the effect of wealth in 2002. The sign is opposite to the estimated effect of the 
actual  reform  in  1999.  A  positive  trend  in  the  effect  of  wealth  towards  the  end  of  the 
estimation period, which I do not account for in the baseline estimation, tends to bias the 
negative impact of the actual bankruptcy law reform on the effect of wealth towards zero. 
Thus, in absolute terms, the estimated effect of the 1999 reform should be interpreted as a 
lower bound to the true effect in the model of self-employment state. 
                                                 
18  The  insignificance  is  not  due  to  the  smaller  sample  size  in  the  placebo  reform  estimations,  because  the 
standard errors of the interaction term coefficients are not much larger than in the baseline estimations. The 
coefficients are insignificant because their point estimates are substantially closer to zero. The same applies to 
the estimated DID.   21
Table 2: Placebo reforms in 1996 and 2002 
  Placebo reform in 1996 (data: 1993-98)  Placebo reform in 2002 (data: 1999-04) 
  Entry  Exit  Self-em. state  Entry  Exit  Self-em. state 
postref  -0.0930  -0.0926  -0.0109  0.1056  0.1421  -0.1247** 
  (0.2052)  (0.2482)  (0.0593)  (0.2262)  (0.2390)  (0.0612) 
wealth  0.0491***  0.0023  0.0798***  0.0081  -0.0925  0.0269*** 
  (0.0138)  (0.0145)  (0.0177)  (0.0087)  (0.0744)  (0.0069) 
postref * wealth  -0.0042  -0.0321  -0.0195  -0.0069  -0.1725  0.0356*** 
  (0.0189)  (0.0359)  (0.0145)  (0.0218)  (0.1405)  (0.0110) 
duration  -0.3393***  -0.3398***    -0.6736***  -0.4593***  -0.0012 
  (0.0684)  (0.0836)    (0.1250)  (0.0922)  (0.0375) 
dur_sq  0.0187***  0.0174**    0.0432***  0.0321***  -0.0100*** 
  (0.0061)  (0.0075)    (0.0150)  (0.0086)  (0.0032) 
dur_cu  -0.0003**  -0.0003    -0.0009*  -0.0006***  0.0002*** 
  (0.0001)  (0.0002)    (0.0005)  (0.0002)  (0.0001) 
notempl  0.8799**      -0.2588     
  (0.3456)      (0.3623)     
duration_ne  -0.1726      0.4057*     
  (0.2782)      (0.2389)     
dur_sq_ne  0.0471      -0.0170     
  (0.0500)      (0.0323)     
dur_cu_ne  -0.0028      -0.0002     
  (0.0024)      (0.0012)     
control variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Wald c
2  310.957  107.991  391.375  247.418  140.784  481.908 
Log likelihood  -1603.355  -609.568  -6913.819  -1232.227  -537.135  -6240.533 
Person years  30055  2067  32122  25738  1982  27720 
Mean outcome  0.010414  0.100629  0.064348  0.009480  0.095358  0.071501 
Effect pre reform  0.000521**  0.000198  0.004527***  0.000072  -0.007102  0.001692*** 
  (0.000225)  (0.001283)  (0.001246)  (0.000087)  (0.006035)  (0.000517) 
Effect post reform  0.000435**  -0.002374  0.003340***  0.000012  -0.019596**  0.003695*** 
  (0.000186)  (0.002771)  (0.000829)  (0.000196)  (0.009587)  (0.000970) 
DiD Ai/Norton  -0.000087  -0.002573  -0.001187  -0.000059  -0.012494  0.002004*** 
  (0.000220)  (0.002998)  (0.000884)  (0.000209)  (0.010327)  (0.000768) 
DiD Puhani  -0.000040  -0.002553  -0.001083  -0.000066  -0.012758  0.002107*** 
  (0.000186)  (0.002947)  (0.000818)  (0.000213)  (0.010453)  (0.000755) 
Notes: The table shows estimation results for logit models of the yearly probabilities of entry into and exit out of 
self-employment  and  of  being  self-employed.  The  upper  panel  displays  logit  coefficients  with  cluster  and 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis and additional statistics. The lower panel shows the average 
marginal effects of wealth before and after the reform of the insolvency code, and the difference following Ai and 
Norton (2003) and Puhani (2008), with standard errors calculated based on the Delta method. Stars (***/**/*) 
indicate significance of logit coefficients at the 1%/5%/10% levels. 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP (1993-2004). 
 
I conduct further robustness checks to test if the results are sensitive to specification choices. 
Table 3 shows the results for the model of self-employment state; the results for the entry and 
exit models appear in Table 4 and Table 5. In the following, I first comment on the results 
from the models of self-employment state and entry, later returning to the exit model at the 
end of this section.   22 
Table 3: Probability of being self-employed: Robustness checks 




D: Incl. gross  
labor income 
E: Incl. risk 
attitude 










postref  0.0509  0.1677**  0.1014  0.0380  0.4680*  0.0967  0.0811*  0.2650***  -0.0492 
  (0.0687)  (0.0746)  (0.0775)  (0.0843)  (0.2579)  (0.0665)  (0.0437)  (0.0857)  (0.0726) 
wealth  0.1685***  0.3989***  0.0520***  0.0524***  0.0614***  0.0679***  0.0559***  0.0737***  0.0685*** 
  (0.0252)  (0.0864)  (0.0115)  (0.0116)  (0.0164)  (0.0124)  (0.0144)  (0.0121)  (0.0124) 
postref * wealth  -0.0360  -0.1920**  -0.0214*  -0.0190*  -0.0433***  -0.0340***  -0.0175  -0.0411***  -0.0328*** 
  (0.0292)  (0.0877)  (0.0117)  (0.0104)  (0.0166)  (0.0123)  (0.0164)  (0.0116)  (0.0126) 
wealth_sq  -0.0049***                 
  (0.0012)                 
postref * wealth_sq  0.0026**                 
  (0.0012)                 
wealth_cu  0.0000***                 
  (0.0000)                 
postref * wealth_cu  -0.0000***                 
  (0.0000)                 
grosslaborinc      0.2915***             
      (0.0380)             
risk tolerance        0.1723***           
        (0.0276)           
time trend          -0.0617         
          (0.0463)         
time trend * wealth          0.0018         
          (0.0023)         
control variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes 
Log likelihood  -13378.798  -15621.999  -11156.994  -9693.174  -13459.487    -2399.018  -20342.258  -13072.046 
Person years  59842  68453  56850  43717  59842  59842  10218  90486  57614 
Mean outcome  0.067662  0.068485  0.057889  0.067983  0.067662  0.067662  0.071247  0.067591  0.068421 
Effect pre reform    0.023545***  0.002530***  0.003055***  0.003110***  0.003926***  0.003398***  0.003981***  0.004203*** 
    (0.006097)  (0.000704)  (0.000867)  (0.001022)  (0.000918)  (0.001060)  (0.000859)  (0.000959) 
Effect post reform    0.012876**  0.001584***  0.001977***  0.001274  0.002056***  0.002449***  0.002094***  0.002053*** 
    (0.005862)  (0.000533)  (0.000672)  (0.001739)  (0.000700)  (0.000927)  (0.000539)  (0.000537) 
DiD Ai/Norton    -0.010669*  -0.000945  -0.001078  -0.001836  -0.001870**  -0.000949  -0.001887**  -0.002150** 
    (0.005628)  (0.000628)  (0.000669)  (0.001365)  (0.000797)  (0.001041)  (0.000747)  (0.000847) 
DiD Puhani    -0.011950**  -0.001107*  -0.001119*  -0.003048**  -0.002060***  -0.001114  -0.002642***  -0.001885** 
    (0.005705)  (0.000629)  (0.000642)  (0.001301)  (0.000795)  (0.001058)  (0.000816)  (0.000762) 
Notes: The table shows estimation results for logit models of the yearly probabilities being self-employed. The upper panel displays logit coefficients with cluster 
and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis and additional statistics. The lower panel shows the average marginal effects of wealth before and 
after the reform of the insolvency code, and the difference following Ai and Norton (2003) and Puhani (2008), with standard errors calculated based on the Delta 
method. Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance of logit coefficients at the 1%/5%/10% levels. Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP (1993-2004).   23 
Table 4: Probability of entry into self-employment: Robustness checks 




D: Incl. gross  
labor income 
E: Incl. risk 
attitude 










postref  -0.0983  -0.0108  -0.1443  0.0274  -0.7935  -0.0985  -0.1092  -0.0022  -0.2316 
  (0.2220)  (0.2099)  (0.2224)  (0.2713)  (1.0775)  (0.2196)  (0.2160)  (0.2382)  (0.2311) 
wealth  0.1387***  0.1877  0.0480***  0.0467***  0.0497**  0.0491***  0.0564***  0.0492***  0.0473*** 
  (0.0400)  (0.1143)  (0.0096)  (0.0124)  (0.0194)  (0.0094)  (0.0201)  (0.0085)  (0.0097) 
postref * wealth  -0.0993  -0.1167  -0.0443***  -0.0410**  -0.0433  -0.0346**  -0.0292  -0.0414***  -0.0612*** 
  (0.0707)  (0.1598)  (0.0144)  (0.0163)  (0.0290)  (0.0146)  (0.0255)  (0.0128)  (0.0179) 
wealth_sq  -0.0052*                 
  (0.0027)                 
postref * wealth_sq  0.0041                 
  (0.0042)                 
wealth_cu  0.0001*                 
  (0.0000)                 
postref * wealth_cu  -0.0000                 
  (0.0000)                 
grosslaborinc      -0.0156             
      (0.0607)             
risk tolerance        0.1571***           
        (0.0285)           
time trend          0.1165         
          (0.1960)         
time trend * wealth          -0.0003         
          (0.0045)         
control variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes 
Log likelihood  -2857.206  -3324.885  -2742.717  -2128.460  -2860.927    -455.755  -4367.834  -2794.698 
Person years  55793  63765  53559  40745  55793  55793  9490  84370  53672 
Mean outcome  0.009983  0.010147  0.010008  0.010480  0.009983  0.009983  0.009905  0.010158  0.010192 
Effect pre reform    0.001914  0.000507***  0.000478**  0.000733  0.000524***  0.000569  0.000496***  0.000531*** 
    (0.001289)  (0.000181)  (0.000210)  (0.000626)  (0.000182)  (0.000353)  (0.000160)  (0.000190) 
Effect post reform    0.000683  0.000032  0.000056  0.000042  0.000135  0.000238  0.000075  -0.000117 
    (0.001265)  (0.000096)  (0.000106)  (0.000293)  (0.000114)  (0.000225)  (0.000098)  (0.000132) 
DiD Ai/Norton    -0.001232  -0.000476**  -0.000421*  -0.000691  -0.000389**  -0.000332  -0.000421**  -0.000648*** 
    (0.001645)  (0.000202)  (0.000229)  (0.000562)  (0.000195)  (0.000303)  (0.000178)  (0.000250) 
DiD Puhani    -0.001121  -0.000388**  -0.000410*  -0.000287  -0.000323*  -0.000255  -0.000396**  -0.000515** 
    (0.001563)  (0.000171)  (0.000215)  (0.000264)  (0.000165)  (0.000261)  (0.000165)  (0.000214) 
Notes: The table shows estimation results for logit models of the yearly entry probabilities into self-employment. The upper panel displays logit coefficients with 
cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis and additional statistics. The lower panel shows the average marginal effects of wealth before 
and after the reform of the insolvency code, and the difference following Ai and Norton (2003) and Puhani (2008), with standard errors calculated based on the 
Delta method. Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance of logit coefficients at the 1%/5%/10% levels. Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP (1993-2004).   24 
Table 5: Probability of exit from self-employment: Robustness checks 




D: Incl. gross  
labor income 
E: Incl. risk 
attitude 










postref  0.2227  0.0623  0.0960  -0.0024  1.1499  0.1903  0.6088**  -0.0161  -0.5276* 
  (0.2407)  (0.2378)  (0.2639)  (0.2789)  (1.3593)  (0.2343)  (0.2864)  (0.2723)  (0.2901) 
wealth  -0.1296*  -0.3696**  -0.0044  0.0031  0.0215  -0.0060  0.0010  -0.0032  -0.0124 
  (0.0672)  (0.1559)  (0.0150)  (0.0219)  (0.0385)  (0.0177)  (0.0530)  (0.0118)  (0.0179) 
postref * wealth  -0.1909  0.0666  -0.0931  -0.1320*  -0.0398  -0.1027  -0.0323  -0.0344  -0.0541 
  (0.1484)  (0.2049)  (0.0652)  (0.0782)  (0.1189)  (0.0693)  (0.0629)  (0.0262)  (0.0368) 
wealth_sq  0.0150*                 
  (0.0078)                 
postref * wealth_sq  0.0113                 
  (0.0188)                 
wealth_cu  -0.0003*                 
  (0.0002)                 
postref * wealth_cu  -0.0003                 
  (0.0005)                 
grosslaborinc      -0.1233***             
      (0.0459)             
risk tolerance        -0.3275***           
        (0.1081)           
risk tolerance square        0.0293***           
        (0.0101)           
time trend          -0.1587         
          (0.2426)         
time trend * wealth          -0.0114         
          (0.0130)         
control variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Log likelihood  -1155.608  -1387.028  -944.187  -880.749  -1159.104    -204.203  -1757.877  -1118.814 
Person years  4049  4688  3291  2972  4049  4049  728  6116  3942 
Mean outcome  0.098049  0.101536  0.097539  0.106662  0.098049  0.098049  0.104396  0.098757  0.096398 
Effect pre reform    -0.030293**  -0.000360  0.000278  0.001276  -0.000488  0.000066  -0.000269  -0.001205 
    (0.014566)  (0.001229)  (0.001979)  (0.002443)  (0.001452)  (0.003542)  (0.000991)  (0.001755) 
Effect post reform    -0.026517*  -0.007766  -0.010310  -0.002156  -0.009168  -0.002971  -0.002995  -0.004241 
    (0.015182)  (0.005389)  (0.006567)  (0.017487)  (0.005934)  (0.004006)  (0.002069)  (0.002601) 
DiD Ai/Norton    0.003776  -0.007406  -0.010589  -0.003432  -0.008680  -0.003037  -0.002726  -0.003036 
    (0.017791)  (0.005460)  (0.006818)  (0.015700)  (0.006030)  (0.005047)  (0.002197)  (0.002728) 
DiD Puhani    0.005825  -0.007416  -0.010557  -0.004697  -0.008666  -0.003065  -0.002739  -0.003449 
    (0.018011)  (0.005441)  (0.006718)  (0.014131)  (0.006022)  (0.006025)  (0.002171)  (0.002510) 
Notes: The table shows estimation results for logit models of the yearly exit probabilities out of self-employment. Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance of logit 
coefficients at the 1%/5%/10% levels. See notes under Table A 3 for further explanations. Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP (1993-2004).   25
In Specification B I allow for a non-linear effect of wealth. I specify a third degree polynomial 
of wealth and interact the wealth terms with the post reform dummy. Again the effects of 
wealth on being self-employed and entry are significant and positive within a relevant range 
of wealth. The interaction terms with the post reform dummy are jointly significant at the 1% 
level  in  both  models  (although  not  individually  significant  in  the  entry  model).  The 
coefficients of the interaction terms are always of opposite sign to the wealth terms, which 
again shows that the policy reform attenuated the effect of wealth towards zero.
19 
In Spec. C, instead of the estimated  continuous wealth variable,  I  use  a very  simple 
wealth  indicator  which  is  available  every  survey  year:  A  dummy  variable  indicating  if 
somebody owns the dwelling he or she lives in. Because the wealth indicator is a dummy 
variable, Spec. C represents the standard DID estimator, just with the coding opposite to the 
usual conduct: Wealth=0 indicates treatment and wealth=1 indicates the control group (keep 
in mind that the less wealthy are considered to be affected by the reform of bankruptcy law). 
In the model of self-employment state, the coefficient of the interaction term and the DID are 
negative and significant. In fact, the DID indicates that the reform reduced the positive pre-
reform effect of homeownership by 45% (Ai and Norton’s method) or 51% (Puhani’s method) 
in relative terms, which is very similar to the results from the baseline estimation (47% or 
52%). In the entry model, the interaction term’s coefficient is also negative, but statistically 
insignificant. Presumably, the home ownership dummy as a wealth measure is too imprecise 
and therefore inflates the standard error too much. Note that because transitions are rare and 
because of the smaller sample size in the transition models, significant results are generally 
less frequent in the models of entry and exit than in the model of self-employment state. 
In  Spec.  D  I  include  gross  labor  income  in  the  month  before  the  interview  as  an 
additional control variable (I do not include it in the baseline model because of potential 
                                                 
19 As the nonlinearity is not very pronounced in the relevant range of wealth, I use the linear approximation in 
the baseline estimation for ease of interpretation.   26
endogeneity). The coefficient of the interaction term remains negative and significant in both 
the models of entry and self-employment state.
20 The coefficient of gross income itself is 
insignificant in the entry model. 
Spec. E controls for the self-reported risk attitude, as Caliendo et al. (2009) report a 
significant and positive effect of risk tolerance on entry. This finding is confirmed here on a 
different estimation period. The risk attitude was first elicited in the SOEP questionnaire of 
2004, which asked respondents to state their general willingness to take risks on an 11-point 
scale  ranging  from  0  to  10.
21  As  I  have  to  impute  the  answers  given  in  2004  into  the 
estimation period, I lose people not observed in 2004, which is why I do not include the risk 
attitude in the baseline estimations. The negative and significant change in the effect of wealth 
due  to  the  bankruptcy  law  reform  remains  stable  in  both  the  models  of  entry  and  self-
employment state. 
Spec. F includes a time trend and its interaction with wealth, which allows for differential 
time trends by wealth. The time trend and its interaction are jointly insignificant at the 10% 
level  in  both  the  models  of  entry  and  state,  which  indicates  that  there  were  no  reform-
independent differential time trends for people with different wealth levels. This confirms the 
results  from  the  placebo  tests  and  further  supports  the  plausibility  of  the  identifying 
assumption.  As  the  time  trend  and  the  interaction  are  jointly  insignificant,  they  can  be 
excluded from the final specification. It is also reassuring that the change in the wealth effect 
triggered  by  the  1999  reform  remains  negative  in  both  models,  although  statistically 
significant only in the model of self-employment state. The insignificance in the entry model 
may be explained by multicollinearity, which may increase the standard error too much.  
                                                 
20 In Spec. D of the model of self-employment state, the estimated DID is significant if calculated following 
Puhani (2008), but insignificant following Ai and Norton (2003). The same is observed in Spec’s E and F of the 
state model. The fact that the coefficient of the interaction term is significant in the three specifications suggests 
that Puhani’s method is more adequate here. 
21 Dohmen et al. (2005) conduct a field experiment with real money at stake and find that this survey measure of 
risk attitude reliably predicts actual risk taking behavior.   27
Entry into self-employment is a rare event, as only 1% of the population switch to self-
employment in any given year. King and Zeng (2001) suggest an adjusted logit estimator for 
rare  events  data  that  corrects  otherwise  potentially  severe  finite  sample  bias.  In  this 
application, the results in Spec. G using this estimator are similar, however, which indicates 
that the standard logit estimator is appropriate here. 
Last, but not least, we test the sensitivity of the results with respect to different estimation 
periods. In Spec. H I choose the narrowest time window possible, only one year each before 
and after the reform. The point estimates for the coefficients of the interaction terms are 
negative again in the models of entry and self-employment state, but they are statistically 
insignificant, presumably because the small sample size inflates the standard errors. Spec. I 
uses a long period of 9 years both before and after the reform, which replicates the negative 
and significant results of the baseline model and yields similar magnitudes of the effects. This 
indicates  that  the  effects  of  the  bankruptcy  law  reform  are  not  limited  to  the  short  term. 
Finally, one may wonder if the internet bubble, which saw a large number of start-ups in the 
IT sector, may influence the results in some way. Thus in Spec. J I exclude the years 2000 and 
2001, but otherwise stick to the estimation period of the baseline estimations. The change in 
the effect of wealth remains negative and significant in both models. 
In the model of exit (Table 5), almost all the robustness checks confirm the result from 
the baseline estimation that the bankruptcy law reform did not significantly change the effect 
of wealth on the yearly probability of exit from self-employment. This finding includes the 
nonlinear Spec. B, where the three interaction terms with the post reform dummy are jointly 
not even significant at the 10% level. Only in Spec. E including risk attitude, we observe a 
negative interaction term which is significant at the 10% level, but the estimated DID remain 
insignificant.
22 Note that I also include the square of risk tolerance in this specification, as 
                                                 
22  The  significance  of  the  interaction  term  could  easily  be  due  to  sampling  error,  given  that  actually  10 
specifications are estimated.   28
Caliendo  et  al.  (2010)  report  that  risk  tolerance  has  a  U-shaped  effect  on  exit  from  self-
employment. This result is confirmed here using a different time period: The minimal risk of 
exit is found at a medium level of risk tolerance of about 5-6 on the 11-point scale. 
6  Conclusion 
The model developed in this paper illustrates that a more forgiving personal bankruptcy law, 
which allows a “fresh start” for insolvent entrepreneurs, may have two opposing effects on the 
attractiveness  of  entrepreneurial  activity  in  comparison  to  wage  work.  On  the  one  hand, 
forgiving personal bankruptcy proceedings provide insurance, as entrepreneurs enjoy a partial 
discharge from debt in case of misfortune. On the other hand, they also increase interest rates, 
because banks demand a risk premium as compensation for the lower expected recovery in 
case of debtor bankruptcy. The model further shows that both effects are more pronounced for 
less wealthy potential entrepreneurs, because the wealthy bring in their wealth as collateral 
and thus neither benefit as much from the insurance, nor suffer as much from the increased 
interest rates. 
The introduction of the German Insolvency Code in 1999, which newly provides a “fresh 
start” policy, serves as  a natural  experiment to test the model and to  assess which effect 
dominates. The results indicate that the insurance effect outweighs the interest effect. Thus, 
the  “fresh  start”  makes  entrepreneurship  more  attractive,  especially  for  the  less  wealthy. 
Sensitivity analysis shows that the results are robust. 
The  findings  contribute  to  the  literature  highlighting  the  value  of  a  more  forgiving 
personal bankruptcy law for entrepreneurship. In the light of these results, the current plan of 
the German government to reduce the time to discharge from personal debt from 6 to only 3 
years can be expected to further increase entrepreneurial activity. Countries without a “fresh 
start” policy may want to consider introducing it if the promotion of entrepreneurship is a 
policy objective. Precise ex-ante quantification of the effect of future reforms of personal   29
bankruptcy law on entrepreneurship requires a more structural estimation approach, which is a 
possible avenue for future research. 
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Appendix A: Supplementary Tables 
Table A 1: Weighted mean characteristics by employment type 
  Self-employed  Employees  Not working 
highschool  0.382  0.219  0.144 
apprenticeship  0.428  0.554  0.530 
highertechncol  0.294  0.210  0.189 
university  0.299  0.169  0.100 
female  0.301  0.448  0.773 
east  0.194  0.229  0.239 
south  0.264  0.259  0.255 
north  0.133  0.124  0.128 
age  41.5  39.1  40.7 
prworkexp10  1.567  1.473  1.148 
prunempexp  0.415  0.401  0.804 
disabled  0.029  0.059  0.084 
german  0.967  0.958  0.945 
nchild  0.762  0.659  0.924 
married  0.654  0.622  0.757 
fatherse  0.188  0.081  0.078 
wealth  2.526  0.994  1.173 
homeowner  0.558  0.461  0.518 
grosslaborinc  2952  2095  0 
duration  6.669  9.187  4.396 
risk tolerance  5.316  4.732  4.138 
Person years  4049  44196  11597 
Notes:  The  table  shows  means  of  the  variables  used  in  this  analysis  by 
employment state, weighted using population weights. For risk tolerance, the 
number of person years is lower than for the other variables (2972, 32698, and 
8047 for the self-employed, employees, and not working people, respectively). 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP (1993-2004). 
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Table A 2: Description of variables 
Variable  Definition 
highschool  Dummy for individuals who finished higher secondary school with a university entrance 
qualification ("Fachhochschulreife" or "Abitur") 
apprenticeship  Dummy for individuals who finished an apprenticeship ("Lehre") 
highertechncol  Dummy for individuals who finished a higher technical college, a health care school, or 
civil service training ("Berufsschule", "Schule Gesundheitswesen", "Fachschule", 
"Meister", "Beamtenausbildung", or "Sonstige Ausbildung") 
university  Dummy for individuals who have a university degree 
female  Dummy for females 
east  Dummy for individuals living in the area of former East Germany or Berlin. 
south  Dummy for individuals living in Baden Wuerttemberg or Bavaria. 
north  Dummy for individuals living in Schleswig Holstein or Lower Saxony. 
age  Age of individual 
prworkexp10
a  Years of full time work experience prior to the year of observation, divided by 10 
prunemexp
a  Years of unemployment experience prior to the year of observation 
disabled  Dummy for handicapped / physically challenged individuals 
german  Dummy for German nationality 
nchild  Number of children under 17 in the household 
married  Dummy for married and not separated individuals. Omitted category for marital status is 
"single"/"widowed" 
fatherse  Dummy for individuals whose father was self-employed when the respondents were 15 
years old 
wealth  Estimated sum of financial assets, owner occupied property and  other property in 
100,000 euro, deflated to 1998 prices using the Consumer Price Index 
homeowner  Dummy for individuals who own their dwelling 
grosslaborinc  Real gross monthly income from paid work (self-employment or regular employment) in 
1000 euro, deflated to 1998 prices using the Consumer Price Index 
duration
a  Tenure of current spell (self-employment, regular employment or 
unemployment/inactivity). For left-censored spells, the duration since the last job change 
is used, which may be shorter than the overall spell if somebody switched jobs 
notempl  Dummy for individuals not in paid work 
prostref  Dummy for observations in and after 1999 
x_sq  Square of variable x 
x_cu  Cube of variable x 
x_ne  Interaction term of variable x with the dummy variable notempl 
Notes: Dummy variables equal 1 if condition holds and 0 otherwise. 
a Uses information from the lifetime employment history in the SOEP. 
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Table A 3: Estimation of the net value of owner occupied housing 
needsSomeRenovation  -1.62e+04*** 
  (4975.3104) 
needsFullRenovation  -5.25e+04*** 
  (1.12e+04) 
Size  919.2060*** 
  (245.6902) 
size_sq  -0.8789 
  (0.8412) 
interestMortgage  -41.2967*** 
  (7.6973) 
yearsInDwelling  -545.1070** 
  (240.1739) 
interestMortgage * yearsInDwelling  1.2690** 
  (0.6228) 
city2to20th  3556.1265 
  (6528.6200) 
city20to100th  2124.6516 
  (7427.4328) 
city100thTo500th  1.62e+04* 
  (8455.6738) 
cityGe500th  2.58e+04* 
  (1.32e+04) 
centralDistrict  -509.6278 
  (6141.3238) 
cityMissing  1144.6627 
  (6650.4868) 
Rowhouse  -1.09e+04 
  (1.78e+04) 
apt3to8units  -950.9687 
  (2.73e+04) 
apt9plusUnits  -3.06e+04 
  (1.97e+04) 
otherBuilding  6475.4284 
  (1.33e+04) 
balconyTerrace  2.09e+04*** 
  (6053.7877) 
Garden  1.34e+04 
  (9193.2381) 
7 dummies indicating building age  yes 
15 federal state dummies  yes 
constant  -3.85e+04 
  (2.95e+04) 
R2  0.151 
Person years  2596 
Mean outcome  1.05973e+05 
Notes: The table shows estimated coefficients of an OLS regression explaining the net value of 
owner occupied houses and apartments. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP (2002). 
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Table A 4: Probability of self-employment transitions and state: Full results  
  A: Entry  A: Exit  A: Self-em. state 
postref  -0.0948  0.1909  0.0965 
  (0.2197)  (0.2364)  (0.0665) 
wealth  0.0483***  -0.0141  0.0682*** 
  (0.0094)  (0.0178)  (0.0124) 
postref * wealth  -0.0450***  -0.1057  -0.0339*** 
  (0.0146)  (0.0699)  (0.0123) 
duration  -0.4500***  -0.4144***   
  (0.0578)  (0.0641)   
dur_sq  0.0241***  0.0261***   
  (0.0055)  (0.0060)   
dur_cu  -0.0004***  -0.0005***   
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)   
notempl  0.3134     
  (0.2418)     
duration_ne  0.1484     
  (0.1630)     
dur_sq_ne  0.0009     
  (0.0240)     
dur_cu_ne  -0.0005     
  (0.0010)     
highschool  0.1302  -0.0379  0.4469*** 
  (0.1443)  (0.1784)  (0.1160) 
apprenticeship  -0.0576  0.1452  -0.1972** 
  (0.1207)  (0.1662)  (0.1004) 
highertechncol  0.1787  -0.1711  0.3625*** 
  (0.1362)  (0.1833)  (0.1085) 
university  0.5621***  0.0040  0.1649 
  (0.1603)  (0.1829)  (0.1297) 
female  -0.7520***  0.6040***  -0.8895*** 
  (0.1095)  (0.1247)  (0.0969) 
east  -0.5089***  -0.2787*  -0.1006 
  (0.1328)  (0.1596)  (0.1120) 
south  -0.1585  -0.0664  -0.0359 
  (0.1230)  (0.1541)  (0.1120) 
north  -0.1456  -0.3530*  0.0868 
  (0.1618)  (0.2114)  (0.1505) 
age  0.2164***  -0.0339  0.2265*** 
  (0.0606)  (0.0707)  (0.0495) 
agesq  -0.0026***  0.0005  -0.0024*** 
  (0.0008)  (0.0009)  (0.0006) 
prworkexp10  0.6544**  -0.5462*  0.2704 
  (0.2753)  (0.3046)  (0.2158) 
prworkexp10_sq  -0.2280***  0.1091  -0.0783 
  (0.0802)  (0.0778)  (0.0587) 
prunempexp  -0.0682  0.0046  0.0359 
  (0.0660)  (0.0998)  (0.0911) 
prunempexp_sq  0.0047  0.0170  -0.0179 
  (0.0071)  (0.0110)  (0.0186) 
disabled  -0.1026  0.4506  -0.6853*** 
  (0.2204)  (0.2836)  (0.1936) 
german  0.0706  0.0894  0.0127 
  (0.1869)  (0.2432)  (0.1851) 
Continued on the following page 
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Table A 4 continued 
  A: Entry  A: Exit  A: Self-em. state 
nchild  -0.0397  0.0151  0.0051 
  (0.0536)  (0.0683)  (0.0428) 
married  0.0037  0.2277  -0.2533*** 
  (0.1137)  (0.1460)  (0.0952) 
fatherse  0.4122***  -0.3465*  0.9172*** 
  (0.1568)  (0.1944)  (0.1240) 
d1994  0.1163  -0.1669  -0.0612 
  (0.1959)  (0.2424)  (0.0464) 
d1995  0.0074  -0.4291*  -0.0742 
  (0.2019)  (0.2569)  (0.0541) 
d1996  -0.0724  -0.1002  -0.0260 
  (0.2052)  (0.2421)  (0.0590) 
d1997  -0.0146  -0.4365*  -0.0190 
  (0.2034)  (0.2596)  (0.0617) 
d1998  0.0450  -0.4589*  -0.0057 
  (0.2018)  (0.2604)  (0.0643) 
d2000  0.0211  -0.3389  -0.1409*** 
  (0.2225)  (0.2464)  (0.0435) 
d2001  -0.1164  -0.6185**  -0.1355*** 
  (0.2368)  (0.2723)  (0.0506) 
d2002  0.0457  0.0461  -0.1835*** 
  (0.2233)  (0.2430)  (0.0574) 
d2003  0.1912  -0.7290**  -0.1889*** 
  (0.2191)  (0.2943)  (0.0593) 
d2004  0.2852  -0.2140  -0.1020 
  (0.2174)  (0.2531)  (0.0632) 
_cons  -7.5070***  -0.2019  -7.4744*** 
  (1.0755)  (1.2598)  (0.8776) 
chi2  482.491  222.605  507.860 
Log likelihood  -2860.929  -1159.590  -13459.909 
Person years  55793  4049  59842 
Mean outcome  0.009983  0.098049  0.067662 
Notes: The table shows estimated logit coefficients of a model of the yearly 
probabilities of entry into and exit out of self-employment and of being self-
employed. Cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP (1993-2004).   38
Appendix B – Hazard Rate Model 
This appendix describes the discrete time hazard rate model used to estimate probabilities of 
entry into and exit from self-employment, conditional on the duration of the current state. Exit 
from  self-employment  and  entry  into  self-employment  are  modeled  analogously;  in  the 
following, a spell refers to a self-employment spell in the exit model and to an employment or 
unemployment/inactive spell in the entry model. Respondents may experience multiple spells 
during the observation period. I use the discrete non-negative random variable Tik to describe 
the duration of the k-th spell of individual i. When a spell terminates in year t (measured from 
the beginning of the spell), Tik takes on a value of t. The hazard rate lik(t) is defined as the 
probability that spell k of person i ends in period t (i.e., a transition occurs) conditional on 
survival until the beginning of t: 
( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) ik ik ik ik ik t X t P T t T t X t l = = ³ .  (B1) 
where Xik(t) is a vector of the characteristics and covariates of individual i in interval t of spell 
k including the personality characteristics. The probability of remaining in the current state in 
period  t  (“survival”),  conditional  on  having  survived  until  the  beginning  of  t,  is  the 
complementary probability 
( ) ( ) , ( ) 1 ( ) ik ik ik ik ik P T t T t X t t X t l > ³ = - .  (B2) 
The survivor function,  which represents the unconditional probability  of remaining in the 
current  spell  until  the  end  of  period  t,  can  be  written  as  the  product  of  the  survival 
probabilities in all periods before and in t: 








= > = - Õ .  (B3) 
Consequently, the unconditional probability of a transition in period t is the probability of 
survival until the beginning of period t, multiplied by the hazard rate in period t:    39
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
( ) 1 ( )
t
ik ik ik ik ik ik P T t X t X t X
t
l l t t
-
=
= = - Õ .  (B4) 
The  model  is  estimated  using  the  maximum  likelihood  method,  which  takes  into  account 
completed spells as well as both left-censored and right-censored spells. For a fully observed 
spell  completed  with  an  exit  from  the  current  employment  state,  the  contribution  to  the 
likelihood  function  is  given  by  equation  (B4).  For  a  right-censored  spell  the  likelihood 
contribution is given by the survivor function (B3), because it is only known that a person 
“survived” until the end of the observation period, but not when the spell will end. Combining 
these two cases, the likelihood contribution of a spell k of an individual i can be written as 
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Õ   (B5) 
where cik is a censoring indicator defined such that cik = 1 if a spell is completed and 0 if a 
spell is right-censored.  
If a spell is left-censored in the SOEP, because person i enters the panel after spell k has 
already lasted uik years, conditioning on survival up to the end of period uik means dividing 
expression (B5) by S(uik). Then the likelihood contribution of the spell is 
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  (B6) 
Note  that  this  more  general  notation  includes  equation  (B5)  for  spells  that  are  not  left-
censored (uik = 0). In the SOEP, retrospective employment history questions enable me to 
recover the spell durations uik and thereby deal with left-censoring.   40
The overall likelihood contribution of an individual i equals the product of the likelihood 
contributions of the Ki spells the person experienced in the observation period. The sample 
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The log-likelihood function is 
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  (B8) 
Define a new binary transition indicator variable yikt = 1 if person i completes spell k in period 
t, and 0 otherwise. The yikt correspond to dummy variables that equal 1 if a transition is 
observed between t and t + 1, and 0 otherwise. Effectively adding some zeros to the sum, it 
can be written 
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  (B9) 
The last expression has exactly the same form as the standard log-likelihood function for a 
binary regression model in which yikt is the dependent variable and the data are organized in 
person-period format, where t is measured from the beginning of the current spell and thus 
measures its duration (cf. Jenkins, 1995). 
The functional form of the hazard rate is specified as a logistic hazard model: 
( ) ( )
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exp ( ) ( )
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,  (B10)   41
where the function f(t) represents the dependence of the hazard rate on the spell duration t 
(baseline hazard), specified as a polynomial function of the third degree. 